Th e goal of this paper is to document and to analyse public administration reform dynamics and outcomes in three selected areas -transparency and accountability, civil service and local self-governments.
Introduction
Slovakia, as an independent sovereign state, was established on 1 January 1993 as the result of the friendly split of former Czechoslovakia into two independent states -the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. It has been a member of the European Union and NATO since 2004. Slovakia has an area of 49,034 km 2 and about 5.5 million inhabitants.
In 1990, the foundation for a new democratic model of public administration (PA) was laid in Slovakia. Th ese changes were intended to overcome and eliminate the shortcomings of centralised control of state administration (Kosorín 2003) . On the central level the standard "three pillar system" (legislative, executive and judicial branches) was established, and free elections were held in 1990. On the sub-national level, the former three-level system of national committees in which state power and administration as well as part of local self-government was concentrated, was abolished in 1990. Under Act No. 369 / 1990 Coll. on Municipal Administration, local self-government was established with approximately 2850 municipalities as territorial and administrative units. Th e fi rst municipal elections were held in 1990.
Th e goal of this paper, based on EUPACK research, is (except for a short general assessment of reform trends) to try to document and to analyse the specifi cs of PA reforms in Slovakia both with regard to dynamics and outcomes and to deliver important insights in the PA reform theory (and practice). Th ree out of fi ve EU-PACK areas are selected -transparency and accountability, civil service and local self-governments. Th is selection is intentional because of the lessons provided.
Th e transparency and accountability case documents that transparency does not automatically deliver accountability and better performance. Slovakia receives relatively high marks from international organisations for the level of access to government information; however, really comprehensive rights of all stakeholders to obtain almost all data about government performance, especially economic data, does not result in better performance and higher accountability -at least not automatically and in the short term. Th is indicates that access itself is not enough, if other accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped.
Th e civil service case is symptomatic. Slovakia adopted standard civil service legislation before accession. However, there is no political party really willing to have independent and professional civil service; for all of them patronage relations are more important in order to be able to control the system. Because of this, the original "good" law was amended many times to achieve reversals towards politicisation and centralisation. Th e tough intervention from the EU level pushed Slovakia to re-introduce core civil service values into the national legislation -by the new civil service law valid as of 2017. However, this change may not deliver much in reality, because of the specifi c national environment.
Th e most interesting case is local self-government. Nowadays, there are 2,890 municipalities in Slovakia. Th e average municipality population size in Slovakia is only 1,870 inhabitants, and the average Slovak municipality has approximately 17 km². With this Slovakia and the Czech Republic are the two most fragmented countries in the EU from the perspective of the average number of inhabitants in the municipality. Th e Slovak municipal system is very close to all principles stated by the European Charter of Local Self-Government -as confi rmed by the Council of Europe monitoring report which was approved in early 2016 -this means that municipalities are equipped with a large set of competences and responsibilities. Th e fact that many too small self-governments are not able to realise them because of a lack of human capital and also other resources is not refl ected in government policies, and there is no actor willing to start a real discussion on how to cope with too high fragmentation.
Major reform trends over the past 20 years
Aft er the starting period of basic democratic changes in the country, not much was done in reforming the public administration (PA) system in Slovakia before the election of the "Dzurinda" cabinet in 1998. Th e "1996 Meciar Government Reform" formally aimed at increasing the eff ectiveness and quality of PA; however, it realised mainly un-necessary administrative changes and in the end just delivered huge costs and minimal results (Mesiková 2008; Nemec and Spacek 2017) .
Aft er general elections in 1998 new Slovak governments revived the issue of PA reform as one of their main goals. Th e core enabling factor was the perspective of EU accession -the Meciar government (moving Slovakia out of integration processes) was replaced by the right-wing coalition of Prime Minister Dzurinda. Th e new government started to do as much as possible to improve integration perspectives -to be able to join the EU in the fi rst wave. Except for the EU accession motivation, one might also fi nd certain "internal" motives in the PA reform realised by this government -the right-wing government was very much in favour of NPM-type changes, consistent with their ideology of less state and less central state. Th e accession motivation resulted, for example, in the adoption of the Civil Service Code and the Public Service Code in July 2001.
To lead the (partly internally driven) decentralisation reform, the position of Government Appointee (Government Proxy) for the Public Administration Reform was created, outside of formal ministerial structures. Viktor Nižnanský, representative of the right-wing political spectrum was appointed to this position. Th e outcome was the Strategy of the Public Administration Reform of the Slovak Republic adopted by the Slovak Government in 1999, and subsequently the Concept of Decentralization and Modernization of the Public Administration in the Slovak Republic was adopted by the Slovak Government in 2000. As one of the fi rst reform steps, in 1999, Slovakia signed the European Charter of Local SelfGovernment with reservations.
Th e main idea of the 2000 -2004 decentralisation reform was that decentralisation would solve all ineffi ciencies. Th e start of the reform was postponed several times because of a lack of political consensus, and only massive interventions of Prime Minister Dzurinda at the beginning of 2001 pushed the processes forward. Aft er this, in very short (too short) time all expected basic legislation was approved by the Parliament, especially:
• Law on creation of regional self-governments -July 2001, Th e reform transferred a massive set of responsibilities to local and regional self-governments, but did not introduce other crucial elements of decentralisation, mainly real fi scal decentralisation (new responsibilities were fi nanced by grants and not from own revenues of self-governments). To remedy the shortcomings, the Project of Further Public Administration Decentralization for 2003 -2006 was adopted by the national government, focusing on two main aspects:
• Fiscal decentralisation (a massive transfer of responsibilities was not immediately followed by changing the fi scal system of the country).
• Changes of the state administration system (a change of territorial structure of administrative bodies, and a change from general to specialised deconcentrated state administration).
Accordingly, new legislation was adopted in 2003 and mainly in 2004, creating a really decentralised public administration and a proper public fi nance system in Slovakia. Th e transfer of responsibilities was fully realised in this period. A new fi scal decentralisation system was established where a large proportion of self-government incomes is from own revenues (including shared taxes). Eff ective mechanisms for horizontal and vertical equalisation, however, were not created. Other important laws from this period are connected with public fi nancial management -in April 2003 the Slovak Government approved the document Stratégia reformy riadenia verejných fi nancií -including medium-term programme performance budgeting, the establishment of the Treasury, a switch to accrual accounting and the abolishment of several specifi c state fi nancial funds (all under the leaderships of the Ministry of Finance). In their Program Declaration (2012 -2016 election period), the second Fico Slovak Government committed themselves to adopting measures to make PA more effi cient and advanced. Th e "ESO Programme" (Effi cient, Reliable and Open state administration) was approved by the Government of the Slovak Republic in April 2012. Th e main idea of this reform was for the government to be simple, well-arranged and accessible, it should work sustainably, transparently and with effi ciently spent fi nancial means. Th e reforms included three main areas:
• the integration of a specialised local state administration into a single state offi ce,
• the establishment of client centres (one-stop-shops) for citizens to ensure contact of the citizens with the integrated local government (planned for 2014 -2015, but not fi nished to date) and,
• the optimisation of administrative processes and administrative structures (including e-government development), planned for 2014 -2020.
Except for these main reforms streams we can also mention the approval of the Guidelines for the Involvement of the Public in the Th e brief overview of reforms (i.e. reforms of the state administration system) indicates one important weak point -"reforms to reform", to distinguish itself from previous governments. At the level of state government, the whole period 1990 -2016 is marked by non-systematic changes in the management from specialised to general deconcentrated state administration and vice versa (Table 1 ). Th ese changes accompanying the territorial changes did not bring greater effi ciency of its function nor signifi cant improvement of public services provided to citizens. 
1990
Specialised deconcentrated state administration system established New administrative structure established (district and sub-district offi ces)
1996
General deconcentrated state administration system established New administrative structure established (regions and districts)
2004
Specialised deconcentrated state administration system established New administrative structure established (district offi ces abolished)
2007
New administrative structure established (regional offi ces abolished)
2014
General deconcentrated state administration system established New administrative structure established (district offi ces reestablished)
Source: own
Transparency and Accountability (or Transparency versus Accountability)
Transparency and accountability belong to the core governance principles (OECD 2015). Th eir importance for any public administration system is confi rmed not only by declarative texts of major international organisation (like SIGMA 2014), but also many important academic studies (e.g. Bovaird and Löffl er 2003 , 2009 or Osborne 2010 ). Vesely's paper (2013), however, indicates that the level of accountability of governments in Central Europe is rather limited overall.
Concerning the concrete country situation, Slovakia is a country with rather contradicting performance indicators for the area of transparency and accountability (Table 2) . On the one hand, Slovakia has made signifi cant eff orts to increase the access to government information. As regards this issue the fi rst really important step was the introduction of free access to the information legal package (from 2001), and step by step increasing the access for citizens to any public data. Th e law on free access to information in its current form is to a large extent fully comparable with (or even more progressive than) the situation in most developed countries. Formally any physical person can ask for all existing non-secret information -and public bodies must provide the required information (they can charge only the real cost connected with the production / reproduction of the requested information). Implementation gaps exist but do not limit the functionality of this law too much. Th ere is no public body collecting the information how many requests were submitted, granted or rejected. Some data are available via the Transparency International Slovakia (for example Velsic 2004) -during three years of the validity of "information law" 8 % of citizens tried to use this instrument -and most of them (approx. 90 %) also received the requested data (representative sample, May 2004).
Th e most visible gap is well described by the fi ndings of Transparency International Slovakia (Sipos et al. 2015) showing that the transparency of public companies remains rather low and does not improve visibly. Th e most important fi ndings are as follows:
• 36 % of public companies have not disclosed the names of managers on their websites.
• Only one out of seven public companies opens its economic information to external reviews.
• 85 % of public companies do not present CVs of their directors on their websites.
• Only one out of ten public companies informs who the subjects of their promotional or donative support are.
• One-fourth of public companies did not respond to information requests of citizens.
• More than one-fourth of public companies do not use a selection procedure to choose the new employees.
• As many as 85 % of public companies do not sell and rent their property by electronic auction.
• Five out of eight public companies off er the sale and the rental of their property on their websites. • Seven of out ten public companies regularly publish their annual report on their website, and only two-thirds publish the summary of profi ts and losses.
• Th e situation is better with the "state-owned" public companies, which averaged a 44 % (from 100) score, and they succeeded in all evaluated areas -they are signifi cantly better than "self-government-owned" public companies.
• Slovak public companies scored only half the points (35 %) compared with ten involved foreign public companies, which scored almost 71 % in ranking.
From 2010 on this set of legislation has also required that all contracts signed by public bodies (except for few secret exemptions and for contracts below the fi xed fi nancial limit) must be stored in the central registry and are valid only aft er they are stored and displayed. With this, all interested persons have full access to all information about governmental purchasing, but also many other types of public expenditures (like grants to non-profi t sector bodies). According to the data by Transparency International Slovakia (Nechala et al. 2015 ):
• From 2011 to 2014 over 780 thousand contracts were published by the central authorities in the Central contract register CRZ. Th e estimate is that 2,700 Slovak municipalities published over one million contracts in total on their own websites within the 4-year period.
• As many as 11 % of the adult Slovak population -or 480,000 thousand peopleclaim to have checked at least one public contract or receipt online since 2011, according to the representative opinion poll of Transparency International Slovakia in late January 2015. Almost 8 % of them did it in the past 12 months, they said in a poll. Th ere are around two percent or 90 thousand heavy users who claim to have checked at least 5 public documents in the four years since the reform was introduced.
• In 2014 the Central Registry and the unoffi cial registry operated by the Transparency International Slovakia were visited 650,000 times.
• Th e change was really benefi cial for the ability of media to perform their watchdog role of public institutions. Control "in real time" is now possible. Most of the recent scandals in Slovakia were "enabled by this infrastructure" and thus had better results in terms of accountability than cases prior to 2011.
Contradictory to this high level of potential access to any government information as demonstrated in existing studies, it does not "produce" increased ac-countability and also does not eff ectively serve as a tool to control corruption. For example, Grega (2013) analysed public procurement in the city of Martin. Th anks to transparency in obtaining data, documenting that many procurements are manipulated was not a problem. In 2015 compulsory e-auctions for public procurement of goods and also -if possible -services and works were introduced (all public bodies had to use the central electronic market to purchase especially off -the-shelf goods) to increase transparency of procurement and to improve its effi ciency. However, as of 2018 this tool is no longer compulsory. It remains unclear if this is to increase the process fl exibility or to re-open space for corruption.
Th e main factor behind the fact that transparency does not promote accountability and does not eff ectively limit corruption is the citizens' behaviour (Nemec et al. 2016) . Several studies confi rm that accountability and responsibility are not required by citizens, and the tolerance for corruption is really high. For example Orviska and Hudson (2003) investigated the scale of the shadow economy in Slovakia, and their results clearly show that tolerance is one of the core factors causing the growth of the informal sector and tax evasion. In a recent study (2017) Hunady investigated factors determining the level of corruption. One of his fi ndings is that the low level of accountability is signifi cantly correlated with the level of corruption in the country (and Slovakia performs very badly on both indicators).
Following the above arguments the core issue for Slovakia is how to address the problem of low social accountability and responsibility. Th e starting point for such analysis might be the question: "Are citizens only victims in this or contributing as well to the existence of the current practices"?
If accountability is not explicitly demanded by citizen (or civil society organisations), the necessary standards can only be achieved in the case of the "goodwill" of politicians. However, if the main "utility" for politicians is power and rent-seeking, such change hardly occurs (Vesely 2013) . Th e fact is that the Slovak citizens today are not "eff ective controllers" of their politicians and bureaucrats. Th e EU-PACK report on characteristics of PA in the EU28 (Th ijs et al. 2017) shows that the "normal" rating of Slovakia for most selected government performance indicators is 20+ (out of 28). However, concerning the trust in government Slovakia ranks 12. Th is fact indicates that a lack of a sense of individual responsibility along with paternalism and fi scal illusion remain important features of a Slovak citizen's behaviour. Some evidence for this is the fact that in Slovakia, 67 % of respondents believe that their problems need to be solved by the state (Buncak et al. 2009 ). Maybe the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats is only the symptom -but the source of illness is much deeper and more complicated to treat -short-term solutions for too limited citizen expectations and too high tolerance do not exist (one of the core problems -if not the core problem -for most developing and transitional countries in the world).
Civil Service Reforms
Civil service constitutes a key element in any administrative system, especially so in new democracies. Th e civil service reform was considered one of the most crucial components of enlargement. Th e development of administrative capacity included the requirement to establish professional and depoliticised civil service systems in the then candidate countries (Staroňová et al. 2014) . However, several studies indicate reform reversal towards politicisation and centralisation, which clearly threatens the fundamental features of democratic governance (Meyer-Sahling 2009 or Randma-Liiv and Drechsler 2017).
Act No. 312 / 2001 Coll. on the Civil Service and the amendments to certain Acts defi ned for the fi rst time the legal relations in the Slovak civil service. Staroňová et al. (2014) write that the Act on Civil Service provided the legal framework for the civil service and was aimed to establish professional, impartial, politically neutral, effi cient and fl exible civil service. Th e Act made a clear distinction between political (minister, state secretary) and apolitical posts (head of offi ce, directors general of the sections, directors of departments and other civil servants at ministries). Th e Civil Service Offi ce was set up and was responsible for the implementation of the law.
Act No. 313 / 2001 Coll. on Public Service regulated the performance of work in public interest and of work related to the territorial self-government. In addition, specialised laws, which established the civil service of soldiers, policemen, customs offi cers and fi refi ghters were adopted. Th e Act on Public Service was replaced by the Act on the execution of work of public interest in 2003, and was amended several times in the following years (similarly to the Act on Civil Service). Signifi cant changes in public service legislation occurred mainly in 2006 and 2008 -connected mainly with the payment system of public servants.
In this way, the legislative framework regulating the status of civil servants and other public sector employees has been created. However, soon aft er the EU accession in 2004 major regressive changes took place (Meyer-Sahling 2009). Th e Civil Service Offi ce, which was politically independent (Staroňová et al. 2014 ) operated only from 2002 to 2006, when it was repealed by the Parliament. Besides personal reasons, other factors infl uencing the abolition of the Civil Service Offi ce were the lack of law harmonisation and the lack of clarity of the law on the civil service, which infl uenced the uncertainty concerning the role of the Civil Service Offi ce. All of this was combined with the disseverance of individual public administration bodies to cooperate with that offi ce. Staňová's (2014) . Th e fi ndings may not surprise those that are already acquainted with the topic. What will surprise them is how much evidence is available out there and how much it contradicts some of the well-known theoretical and practical assumptions.
In 2009 the Civil Service Act was signifi cantly amended, but not in favour of improving the recognition of basic civil service standards in the Slovak conditions. Th is change especially increased the space for politicisation and nepotism in the civil service. Almost all, if not all existing independent evaluations indicate that strengthening the capability of the state civil service in the Slovak Republic in the future is a crucial factor in ensuring an effi cient and eff ective public sector (OECD 2015) and shall be addressed by signifi cant legal and executive changes.
According to Meyer-Sahling (2009) Slovakia (together with Poland and the Czech Republic) represents a group of "destructive reform reversal" countries. Not only the Civil Service Offi ce was abolished, but most of the main civil service principles are not well respected by legislation and especially the practice in Slovakia. Open competition for civil service posts is formally established, but in reality patronage is the main principle for the selection of new civil servants, especially in higher posts (Staroňová et al. 2014) .
Th e civil service in Slovakia is also far from the ideal of political neutrality. Th e legislation and the practice give virtually no guarantees to the senior civil service appointees, making these positions susceptible to political appointments and political pressure. Managers -from the top state secretary / deputy minister down to the head of unit / division -can be "relieved of their duties" at any time and without reason (Meyer-Sahling 2009, 40) .
Another dimension involves performance evaluation and performance pay (Nemec et al. 2005 (Nemec et al. , 2008 . Th e basic salary is fi xed, but the allocation of any nonpredetermined premiums is fully arbitrary and varies in structure and number. Discretionary personal performance bonuses can account for up to or exceeding 100 % of the basic salary grade established in the Civil Service Act. Th is makes for a complicated and opaque remuneration system with a high element of discretion for managers to augment the salaries of their staff (OECD 2015) . For the majority of the authorities the performance appraisal (if existing at all) is not at all related to remuneration, i.e. the link to a salary is missing, although the performance salary component is far from being marginal. Because (including all premiums) heads of service offi ces and directors-general are occasionally paid salaries that are as high as the salaries of top managers in the private sector, this situation is alarming.
To respond to existing gaps -but in reality probably because this issue was an EU conditionality (directly mentioned in EU Semester documents) the Slovak government prepared the new draft Civil Service Act that started to be discussed in the Parliament in late October 2016. Th e law is in force as of 1 June 2017. Several important changes are included in the new Civil Service Law.
Th e list of core civil service principles defi ned at the beginning of the law signifi cantly changed. Th e old law included the following principles -professionalism, political neutrality, impartiality, effi ciency, stability of employment and ethics. Th e new law lists the following principles -professionalism, political neutrality, impartiality, effi cient management, legality, transparent employment, transparent and equal remuneration, stability and equal treatment. From the newly formulated principles, especially the principle of transparent employment is clearly codifi ed also by paragraphs of the law (see later text). A new part on the protection of privacy in the working place was added. Th e new category -the redundant civil servant -is defi ned by the new law, important for paragraphs about dismissal.
Th e fi rst core change is the establishment of the Council for Civil Service (not Civil Service Offi ce). Th e Council is the coordination and monitoring body and consists of fi ve members, elected by the Parliament. One member is proposed by the Parliament, one by the Ombudsman, one by the President of the Supreme Audit Offi ce, one by trade unions and one by the non-profi t sector. Th e Offi ce of the Government is the core executive body in the civil service area. It is responsible for the uniform implementation of the law, systemisation, issues directives, controls, manages the civil service information system, initiates the fi rst part of the "mass recruitment" process and issues the Code of Ethics.
Systemised civil service positions and the civil service information system are newly established institutions. Th e term "organisational change" is more exactly defi ned by the new law -important for paragraphs on dismissal.
Th e second core change is connected with the processes of recruitment. According to the new law, open competition is compulsory (except for defi ned cases), and the process of competition is strictly regulated (written and oral examinations). Individual or "mass" recruitment procedures are possible, depending on the concrete situation.
Th e salary scale is modifi ed -changing the number of salary classes from 11 to 9. Th e salary class is the base for remuneration with a fi xed salary level. Th e fi nal salary is also fi xed and calculated by multiplying the salary class level by the coeffi cient for the length of service. An interesting issue is the fact that the lowest salary in the salary class is below the level of the minimum wage (419.50 EUR versus 435 EUR).
Th e third core change is connected with a more precise defi nition of the processes of dismissal and increased protection of a civil servant against irregular dismissal.
Th e fourth core change is the introduction of exact rules for performance evaluations of civil servants. Th e evaluation is conducted by the supervisor and is realised every year. Four criteria shall be evaluated -knowledge (max. 30 points), competence (max. 20 points), performance (max. 40 points) and personal development (max. 10 points). If a civil servant receives less than 25 points, the evaluation is non-satisfactory. Aft er two such evaluations a civil servant can be dismissed.
Th e list of changes described above shows that Slovakia was pushed by EU pressure to "return" the incorporation of main civil service principles to its legislation. Th e fact that this happened only as the response to external pressure supports our arguments in the previous part. It documents that rather limited social accountability, nepotism, favouritism and political control over civil service are real values for most if not all Slovak politicians.
Local self-government
Local government is a fundamental part of the public administration of a democratic state. Th e subsidiarity principle expects that social and political issues should be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level that is consistent with their resolution (for the local level this principle is the core element of the European Charter of Local Self-Government). However, the territorial, political, and administrative organisation of local governments have diff erent characteristics in each country (Baldersheim and Rose 2008) and the question of the optimum size of selfgovernments does not have a fi nal answer. Th e discussion on fragmentation versus amalgamation has been a frequent issue of the academic literature in the last twenty to thirty years, see, e.g., Bours (1993) , Dahl and Tuft e (1973) , Denters (2002) , Goldsmith and Page (1987) , King (1984) , Mouritzen (1989) , Newton (1992) , Nielsen (1981) , Rose (2002) or Swianiewicz (2010) .
To a relatively large extent the municipalities in Slovakia carry out internal and delegated responsibilities. Th e main service delivery responsibilities allocated to them in 1990 were local public transport in larger towns, construction, maintenance and management of local roads and carparks, public spaces, public green areas, public lighting, market places, cemeteries, local water resources and wells, water supply networks, sewerage and water cleansing establishments in small municipalities; construction, maintenance and management of local cultural establishments, parts of sport, leisure and tourist establishments; children's homes; part of the ambulatory health service establishments; establishments of basic social services (daily care). During the "decentralisation" period of 2000 -2005, municipalities received new responsibilities in the areas of road communications, water management, registration of citizens (delegated responsibility), social care, environmental protection, education (elementary schools and similar establishments -partly delegated responsibility), physical culture, theatres, health care (primary and specialised ambulatory care), local development and tourism. A large portion of these competencies was reallocated from direct ministerial responsibility (hospitals, education, etc.).
Within the limits as set out by law Slovak local self-governments have their own budgets and assets and may issue ordinances that are binding for all individual or corporate bodies within their jurisdiction. Only parliamentary acts can super-sede or invalidate these ordinances, and any modifi cation of the powers of local authorities must be decided by Parliament. Barring statutory exceptions, local authorities are independent of State supervision (for more, see for example, Bucek and Nemec 2012) . Nowadays, there are 2,890 municipalities in Slovakia. Th e average municipality population size in Slovakia is only 1,870 inhabitants, and the average Slovak municipality has approximately 17 km². Only two cities, the capital city Bratislava and Košice have a population size over 100,000 inhabitants (approx. 430,000 in Bratislava and 250,000 in Košice). According to the last general census (2011), only seven other towns / cities have a population over 50,000 inhabitants. Almost 70 % of all Slovak municipalities have less than 1,000 inhabitants, and only slightly more than 16 % of the total population of Slovakia lives in them. Furthermore, several years ago, the smallest municipality, Príkra, had only seven inhabitants, (nowadays it has 12) but according to the relevant legal provisions it has the same competence as the largest Slovak municipalities / towns. Th ree steps relating to decentralisation have been planned in Slovakia since 1989: 1) devolution, 2) fi scal decentralisation, and 3) territorial consolidation. However, aft er the implementation of the fi rst two steps no central government had any interest in continuing with these processes and all of them preferred the status quo (Klimovský 2015) . Because the forced amalgamation from the central level is still politically impossible, the option to cope with possible economic and implementation problems, connected with municipalities which are too small, is inter-municipal cooperation (IMC).
Th e municipalities' right to cooperate has been implemented in Slovakia since 1990. Th e basic legal provision on the IMC is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (No. 460 / 1992) . More detailed legal provisions are written in the Municipal Act, according to which each municipality is entitled (within the performance of their own powers) to cooperate with other territorial and administrative units as well as with the authorities of other countries which carry out any local functions. Th ey also have the right to become a member of international associations of territorial units or territorial authorities. If it is necessary to establish any specifi c body (institution) for the purposes of the IMC, such a body can command only private status. Despite the fact that there is no special law on the IMC in Slovakia, the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic published a methodical instruction on establishing the joint municipal offi ces in 2002. In addition, direct as well as indirect legal provisions linked to the inter-municipal cooperation can be found in some other acts, e.g. Municipal Property Act (No. 138 / 1991).
Nowadays, there are more than two hundred joint municipal offi ces (spoločný obecný úrad) in Slovakia; according to data from the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, there were 235 JMOs on 31 December 2011; in comparison, there were 233 JMOs in 2014. Th e JMOs exclusively execute the delegated state administration, e.g. in the fi eld of building permission, primary education, environmental protection, social care and social services or urban planning (Tichy 2005) . Th e JMOs are of a voluntary nature, but the established JMOs are, to a certain extent coordinated by the Ministry of Interior in order to ensure proper and comparable discharge of their tasks. Th ere are signifi cant diff erences between the JMOs: one can fi nd both single-purpose and multi-purpose JMOs; each municipality can belong to diff erent JMOs for the execution of diff erent tasks; most of the municipalities belong to the JMOs which consist of several municipalities but, the largest JMO provides its services on behalf of 80 municipalities (Klimovský 2014) . In this way the problem of limited capacity of small municipalities is somehow addressed -but only for delegated responsibilities.
Th e association of municipalities to deliver own original competences is much less frequent and is mainly connected with the use of EU funds. Except for a limited number of joint service delivery bodies (especially in the waste management area) voluntary institutionalised regional / local associations are represented by two core sub-groups -Euro-regions and micro-regions. Th e micro-regions have not yet been legally defi ned, but usually they are territorially small units involving a minimum of a few municipalities that have a common historical development, economic interconnection, etc. Th eir nature is based on voluntary association, and sometimes they do not respect offi cial administrative borders. Furthermore, some municipalities are involved in more than one micro-region. Many micro-regions were established in order to strengthen the "fundraising" capacities of local self-governments involved, especially in the fi eld of EU funds, and most of them declared cooperation in the fi elds of development planning, project management, environmental protection and tourism. Concerning the status of the micro-regions, there are no direct legal provisions aimed at them. From this perspective, it is no surprise that their status vary a lot (some of them have the status of non-profi t organisations, some of them are civic associations, and some were established as associations of legal entities).
Th e Institution of the Euro-regions is also a platform for the development of the inter-municipal cooperation and includes diff erent regional development stakeholders from at least two neighbouring countries. Th eir activities are usually linked to development planning, project cooperation, cross-border cooperation, experience as well as knowledge transfer, mutual promotion and tourism.
To conclude we may state that local self-government capacities are legally very well defi ned and secured -Slovakia is sometimes called decentralisation champion (Klimovský 2015) . However, the positive impact of this situation is limited by too high fragmentation -there is no doubt that some municipalities are simply too small to execute the full set of their original and delegated responsibilities. Th is issue is not addressed and probably will not be addressed in the foreseeable future (Klimovský 2015) . Two core and many small barriers block such change. Th e core political issue is the strong political opposition; especially on the municipal level (independence is a much higher value for mayors than, for example, effi ciency -see Bucek and Nemec 2012) . Th e implementation barrier is connected with the fact that there are no comprehensive data available for the preparation of such change. Th ere is no optimum size of a municipality, and according to existing academic research the scale economies (savings thanks to the larger size) cannot be confi rmed for the full block of municipal services (for example according to Matejova et al. 2017 , the economic optimum really diff ers for diff erent services, or does not exist at all). In this situation poor political decisions about the minimum size could lead to massive mistakes (see examples of other CEE countries, like Georgia, revisiting its amalgamation too early aft er realising it). In this situation the central government and especially the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior should promote much more eff ectively all forms of municipal co-operation and especially the establishment of joint municipal offi ces for delegated competencies (or it might be possible to follow the Czech example of diff erent categories of municipalities from the point of view of delegated responsibilities).
Conclusions
Th e Slovak Republic realised two core phases of public administration reform aft er becoming independent in 1993. Th ese are the "decentralisation reform" aft er 2000 and the current ESO reform (with a focus on electronisation and better service delivery). Both reforms used signifi cant inputs and delivered visible outputs, but outcomes maybe less so. Aft er 25 years of reforming, Slovakia lags behind the EU average level for most governance quality indicators (as mapped, for example, by Th ijs et al. 2017) . Th e set of factors determines that reform inputs and outputs are not well converted into outcomes, results and impacts -including path-dependence, limited citizen and third-sector participation, politicisation, lack of accountability and responsibility and realisation of "reforms to reform", to distinguish itself from previous governments. Path-dependency determines the behaviour of all main actors (politicians, bureaucrats, citizens and businesses), and this problem cannot be addressed in short term perspective. A frequently mentioned issue is over-politicisation -especially on the central level. However, how can politicians be motivated to switch from politics to policy ? Eff ective answers are very diffi cult to fi nd, especially when voters do not demand real governance.
Several lessons can be derived from our study, with validity for all countries with a similar internal environment (lack of accountability and responsibility, and priority of politics over real, evidence-based public policy). Maybe the core issue is that "real" reform changes, delivering not only outputs, but also outcomes (measurable but also non-measurable outcomes) and impacts, in countries like Slovakia still need external support and pressure -to push ruling government to switch from "pure politics" to real policy making. Th is fact should be better refl ected by international bodies, especially the EU -as EUPACK results indicate, the EU semester and EU funds are important, but maybe not fully eff ective tools today.
